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In the aftermath of the 2020 election the United States experienced an 
antidemocratic crisis, with a chief executive attempting to delegitimize the 
general election and declare victory in an election that all impartial observ-
ers stated he lost. In comparative terms, the U.S. election system has been 
much maligned—it is highly localized and partisan, and lacks independent 
apex institutions, such as electoral tribunals, that are characteristic of many 
modern democracies. This brief essay builds off our recent joint work on fed-
eralism to argue that state and local governments, which administer elections 
and have refuted claims of widespread voter fraud, are serving as important 
bulwarks against this threat. By separating and dispersing the functions of 
governance—the day-to-day work of governing—U.S. federalism provides 
some protection against authoritarianism. The decentralization of authority 
over elections offers one particularly dramatic example of this dynamic in 
action. Indeed, the U.S. model of dispersing core functions, although messy 
and costly in other ways, may have advantages in some contexts over the 
alternative model of centralized apex institutions, especially by reducing vul-
nerability to capture. 
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Introduction 
The United States recently experienced an antidemocratic crisis, with a 
President attempting to delegitimize the general election and unilaterally de-
clare victory in an election that all impartial observers stated he lost.1 Starting 
well before the election, then-President Trump initiated a widespread public 
relations campaign to persuade the American public that the election would 
be infected with fraud—part of an apparently premeditated plan to declare 
victory on election night regardless of actual results.2 After losing the elec-
tion, and without citing any credible evidence, he declared that widespread 
corruption and fraud had occurred.3 The President attempted to block the 
counting of thousands of legitimate votes through the courts and other outlets, 
demanding on social media that counties “STOP THE COUNT,” and fanning 
the flames of violent protests at county election offices.4 He refused to 
 
1. In televised statements from the White House, from which news networks quickly pulled 
away due to a lack of fact-checking, then-President Trump asserted on November 5: “We were 
winning in all the key locations by a lot, actually. And then our number started miraculously getting 
whittled away in secret, and they wouldn’t allow legally permissible observers.” President Donald 
Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Election (Nov. 5, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-election/ [https://perma.cc/9JSQ-CS38]. 
On Twitter, President Trump stated, “Last night I was leading, often solidly, in many key States, in 
almost all instances Democrat run & controlled. Then, one by one, they started to magically disap-
pear as surprise ballot dumps were counted. VERY STRANGE.” Twitter later flagged and removed 
the posts as potentially misleading. U.S. Election: Twitter Hides Trump Tweet about ‘Disappearing’ 
Lead, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54809165 
[https://perma.cc/6PDQ-7TL8]. President Trump’s appointees exacerbated these authoritarian ef-
forts. For example, Attorney General William Barr authorized all federal prosecutors to “investigate 
‘specific allegations’ of voter fraud before the results of the presidential race are certified . . . Mr. 
Barr’s directive ignored the Justice Department’s longstanding policies intended to keep law en-
forcement from affecting the outcome of an election.” Katie Benner & Michael S. Schmidt, Barr 
Hands Prosecutors the Authority to Investigate Voter Fraud Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/barr-elections.html [https://perma.cc/ESH9-
TYWS].  
2. See Jonathan Swan & Zachary Basu, Off the Rails Episode 1: A Premeditated Lie Lit the Fire, 
AXIOS (Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.axios.com/trump-election-premeditated-lie-ebaf4a1f-46bf-
4c37-ba0d-3ed5536ef537.html [https://perma.cc/66RB-UP5L]. 
3. See Marianna Spring, ‘Stop the Steal’: The Deep Roots of Trump’s ‘Voter Fraud’ Strategy, 
BBC (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-55009950 
[https://perma.cc/F4W3-PWF4] (noting that “President Trump first started tweeting allegations of 
fraud as far back as April” and that “[b]etween then and the election, he mentioned rigged elections 
or voter fraud more than 70 times”); Trump, supra note 1 (“We’ll not allow the corruption to steal 
such an important election or any election, for that matter. And we can’t allow silence –anybody to 
silence our voters and manufacture results . . . . This was unprecedented in American history. This 
was by design.”). 
4. On November 5th, President Trump tweeted “STOP THE COUNT!” Libby Cathey, Trump 
Calls for Vote Counting to Stop as Path to Victory Narrows, Biden Urges All to ‘Stay Calm’, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/overview-trump-calls-vote-count-
ing-stop-path-victory/story?id=74038071 [https://perma.cc/NT52-DVTK]. Later that evening, 
President Trump stated from the Press Briefing Room:  
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concede the election, and for several weeks after the election his officials 
denied the President-elect access to intelligence briefings and other transition 
resources provided for by law.5  
Further, President Trump and his lawyers tried to interfere with the elec-
toral college process in key ways, filing lawsuits and pressuring state and 
local officials to alter or refuse to certify results.6 These efforts came to a 
head on January 6, 2021, when Trump riled up a violent mob to storm the 
United States Capitol in order to interfere with the certification and counting 
of electoral votes.7  
The 2020 election process demonstrated that state and local govern-
ments, which administer elections and have refuted claims of widespread 
 
If you count the legal votes, I easily win. If you count the illegal votes, they can try to 
steal the election from us. If you count the votes that came in late—we’re looking at 
them very strongly. But a lot of votes came in late . . . . To the best of my knowledge, 
votes should be in by Election Day, and they didn’t do that. 
Trump, supra note 1. Meanwhile, protestors, some of them armed, stood outside vote-counting fa-
cilities, demanding votes either be counted or stop being counted, depending on whether Trump was 
leading in that county. Jemima McEvoy, ‘Stop the Count’: Protestors Surround Detroit Vote Count-
ing Site After Trump Lawsuit, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jem-
imamcevoy/2020/11/04/stop-the-count-protesters-surround-detroit-vote-counting-site-after-trump-
lawsuit/?sh=e8d85b64328b [https://perma.cc/6438-SK22] (describing protestors chanting “stop the 
count” in Michigan when Trump began losing his earlier lead to Biden); Simon Romero, Trump 
Supporters Protest at Maricopa County Vote-Counting Site, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/us/politics/trump-supporters-protest-arizona.html  
[https://perma.cc/YQR7-CKUH] (describing protestors demanding officials count every vote where 
Trump was tailing Biden in Maricopa County). 
5. Michael D. Shear, Maggie Haberman & Michael Crowley, Trump Appointee Stands Between 
Biden’s Team and a Smooth Transition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/emily-murphy-trump-biden.html [https://perma.cc/EE5D-
NAPF] (noting how the leader of the General Service Administration denied President-Elect 
Biden’s transition team access to agencies, offices, and funding typically reserved for the incoming 
president). 
6. Maggie Haberman, Jim Rutenberg, Nick Corasanti & Reid J. Epstein, Trump Targets Mich-
igan in His Ploy to Subvert the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/11/19/us/politics/trump-michigan-election.html [https://perma.cc/FC2U-SGF6] (describing 
Trump’s White House meeting with Michigan’s top legislative officials and a phone call to a Wayne 
County election official before Michigan certified its election results); Heidi Przybyla, Dareh Gre-
gorian & Adam Edelman, After Meeting with Trump, Michigan Lawmakers Say They See Nothing 
to Overturn Biden’s Win, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/pol-
itics/white-house/michigan-gop-lawmakers-heckled-arrival-white-house-meeting-n1248396 
[https://perma.cc/X6Y2-HTVF] (quoting campaign lawyer Sidney Powell as stating, “The entire 
election, frankly, in all the swing states should be overturned, and the legislatures should make sure 
that the electors are selected for Trump”); infra note 82 and accompanying text (describing sixty-
two lawsuits).  
7. See Washington Post Staff, Woman Dies After Shooting in U.S. Capitol; D.C. National Guard 
Activated After Mob Breaches Building, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2021, 11:52 PM), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/01/06/dc-protests-trump-rally-live-updates/ 
[https://perma.cc/FC9M-Z8XJ] (describing the events of the riot).  
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voter fraud, served as important (albeit highly imperfect) bulwarks against 
the threat of authoritarianism. If the federal government had more direct con-
trol over elections, the situation—perilous as it was—would likely have been 
far worse. By separating and dispersing the functions of governance—the 
day-to-day work of governing—U.S. federalism substantially curbs the 
power of a potentially autocratic executive.8 U.S. federalism thus served as 
an important protection of democracy in the aftermath of the 2020 presiden-
tial election and attempts to defy the election outcome.  
The threat of erosion of American democracy follows a familiar pattern 
to that seen elsewhere. A number of countries around the world have experi-
enced “democratic backsliding” over the past several decades.9  Recent col-
lapses of democracy have tended to occur not via military coup, but instead 
via legal actions taken by duly elected leaders and their allies.10 These leaders 
use a number of different mechanisms to entrench themselves in power and 
undermine the opposition—effectively tilting the electoral playing field 
heavily in their favor.11   
During the leadership of the Trump administration, comparativists who 
have studied democratic collapses abroad have noted that the U.S. is vulner-
able to this kind of backsliding. They have observed that the former Presi-
dent’s rhetoric is similar to that of authoritarians abroad, and moreover, that 
the United States seems to lack the institutional protections (such as an inde-
pendent electoral court or anticorruption body) that would protect democracy 
in the event of a threat.12 And in the wake of former President Trump’s de-
termined effort to refute the election, experts have described recent events as 
“one of the gravest threats to democracy,” noting that they “never would have 
imagined seeing something like this in America.”13 
 
8. David Landau, Hannah J. Wiseman & Samuel R. Wiseman, Federalism for the Worst Case, 
105 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1190 (2020).  
9. Staffan I. Lindberg, The Nature of Democratic Backsliding in Europe, CARNEGIE EUROPE 
(July 24, 2018), https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/07/24/nature-of-democratic-backsliding-in-europe-
pub-76868 [https://perma.cc/YQ6U-7QRY]. 
10. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1197. 
11. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 2, 21–24 (2018) (identi-
fying four factors that make leaders authoritarian, including rejecting the traditional rules of the 
democratic game, denying political opponents’ legitimacy, tolerating or encouraging violence, and 
being willing to “curtail the civil liberties of rivals and critics”). 
12. ‘How Democracies Die’ Authors Say Trump Is a Symptom of Deeper Problems, NPR (Jan. 
22, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/579670528/how-democracies-die-authors-
say-trump-is-a-symptom-of-deeper-problems [https://perma.cc/Z7TR-PHA5]. 
13. David Leonhardt, Trump’s Refusal to Concede, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/briefing/ron-klain-jeffrey-toobin-tropical-storm-eta.html 
[https://perma.cc/947B-YQZP] (quoting Ryan Enos, a Harvard social scientist, and Michael 
Abramowitz, president of Freedom House).  
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Against a backdrop of a dangerous move toward authoritarianism in the 
United States, we demonstrated in an earlier article that the U.S. version of 
federalism—which decentralizes core functions of governance such as judg-
ing, law enforcement, and electoral administration—offered significant pro-
tection.14 Federalism for the Worst Case argued that the structural separation 
of governance duties between the federal government and the states is anti-
authoritarian in a manner different from that envisioned by the Framers and 
other theorists.15 Specifically, states do not just serve as “guard dogs” for any 
federal misbehavior or as governments that compete with the federal govern-
ment for voter affection. Instead, states remain significantly functionally in-
dependent of, and resistant to capture by, the Executive Branch due to a 
uniquely American mix of tradition, doctrine, and resource constraints.16 Due 
to the way that the administration of governance has evolved over time, states 
perform the day-to-day groundwork of governance in some of the most im-
portant areas of U.S. residents’ lives. State and local governments administer 
elections, do the vast majority of criminal policing, and maintain independent 
courts that dictate the outcome of millions of civil and criminal disputes.17 
Thus, in the case of threatened tyranny, U.S.-style federalism—in which 
local governments and states carry out numerous administrative aspects of 
governance—serves a protection function not replicated by any other aspect 
of our political structure. The separation of governing duties between the fed-
eral government and states helps to prevent the federal government from rap-
idly taking control and converting our democracy to an authoritarian re-
gime.18  
This Article builds upon our institutional theory of federalism as a bul-
wark against tyranny, highlighting the U.S. election crisis to show the essen-
tial nature of state and local actors in preventing tyranny. We do not argue 
here that states are perfect, uniformly well-intentioned, or even competent 
when it comes to governing in general and to elections in particular. The 
events of 2020 make that abundantly clear.19 But the case study of the elec-
tion crisis supports the argument that U.S.-style federalism remains a safe-
guard against authoritarianism despite the many flaws of the system. 
 
14. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1190.  
15. Id.  
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 at 228–29 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864) 
(arguing that state legislatures would “discover the danger” of a federal government’s potential in-
vasions of public liberty); Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius’s Vision, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 745, 746 (2008) (exploring the “guard dog” account). 
17. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1213, 1217–25.  
18. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (describing how the anticomandeering 
doctrine reduces the risk of authoritarianism); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) 
(same); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187–88 (1992) (same).  
19. See infra Part II for discussion of states’ disenfranchisement of voters in the 2020 election.  
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Part I further builds upon the theory propounded in Federalism for the 
Worst Case by outlining two ways in which a nation might protect democ-
racy. The first route, more common in other constitutions around the world, 
is to centralize sensitive functions in the hands of independent apex institu-
tions. The United States has largely eschewed this route in favor of dispersing 
core functions among the states, often in the hands of less insulated and more 
partisan actors. This second route is far messier but may sometimes reduce 
downside risks by making capture of government by the Executive more dif-
ficult and time-consuming.  
Part II further digs into the role that the decentralization of election ad-
ministration may have played in protecting the outcome of the 2020 election. 
Our argument is not that U.S. federalism makes an authoritarian takeover 
impossible. In fact, the 2020 election exposed some weak points through 
which future movements towards authoritarianism might succeed. On the 
whole, however, we do think that our federal system makes democratic de-
cline less likely. Part III explores some significant costs of the U.S. model of 
federalism that the 2020 election illuminated, including localized tyranny, 
inefficiency, and blame-shifting. These costs demonstrate that U.S. federal-
ism is unlikely to be a first-best solution. But by serving as a kind of insurance 
policy that makes worst-case scenarios less likely, it might be a reasonable 
(if imperfect) second best. As we conclude in Part IV, the decentralized U.S. 
model of electoral administration might be improved if it were also more in-
sulated from partisan capture, thus combining the logic of the two models of 
democratic protection.  
I.  Two Models of Democratic Protection: Insulated Centralization 
Versus Dispersion 
In Federalism for the Worst Case, we described two types of modern 
constitutional protections of democracy. By far the dominant model in con-
stitutions around the world is to create apex-level institutions that are insu-
lated from political pressure by the constitution itself, and which defend sen-
sitive democratic functions.20 For example, many constitutions now require 
independent bodies such as anticorruption commissions (to handle prosecu-
tions of high-level politicians where a self-dealing problem would otherwise 
exist), human rights commissions (to protect minority rights), and media 
commissions (to promote and protect an independent press) in addition to 
high courts or constitutional tribunals.21  
Most strikingly, the vast majority of constitutions create independent 
electoral commissions or tribunals charged with running proficient elections 
 
20. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1204. 
21. Id.  
 
102 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 99:96 
 
and preventing political interference or fraud with those events.22 In some 
countries, these tribunals have played a major role in protecting fragile de-
mocracies. For example, in Mexico, the independent Electoral Tribunal, cre-
ated in 1994, has been credited with helping to shepherd the country from 
authoritarianism to democracy, and has consistently been praised for defend-
ing the integrity of Mexican elections.23  
Insulating high-level institutions is a workable strategy in many con-
texts. Its most glaring weakness, however, is its amenability to capture. Au-
thoritarian actors may be able to change the rules, game the rules, or just play 
a patient waiting game in order to place a majority of loyal allies on these 
institutions. Once captured, the institution might begin to attack democracy 
rather than defend it. This problem is illustrated by recent events in Poland, 
where the ruling Law and Justice Party has managed to capture both the Con-
stitutional Court and the National Election Commission and has used them 
to cement itself in power.24 And in Venezuela, the National Electoral Council 
nullified the results of several elections favorable to the opposition and 
stopped a recall of a Maduro mandate, citing alleged fraud.25 
In terms of the modern paradigm of independent democracy-protecting 
institutions, the United States looks dangerously vulnerable. Other than the 
Supreme Court, which now has a solid conservative majority following Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s replacement by Justice Barrett, the country largely lacks the 
battery of national-level democracy-protecting institutions found elsewhere 
around the world. Consider the Mueller investigation, where the Justice De-
partment official charged with investigating wrongdoing by President Trump 
and those around him were left uninsulated (even by statute); commentators 
speculated that the official could have accordingly been fired at any time.26 
Perhaps the clearest example of the United States’ distinctive approach 
to democracy protection is elections. There is no apex-level independent 
 
22. Id.  
23. TODD A. EISENSTADT, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: PARTY STRATEGIES AND 
ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS 66–69, 253–54 (2004). 
24. See Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitu-
tional Populist Backsliding 4–5 (Sydney Law Sch., Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491 [https://perma.cc/EYE7-D3DC]. 
25. David Landau, Constitution-Making and Authoritarianism in Venezuela: The First Time as 
Tragedy, the Second as Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 161, 169–170 (Mark 
A. Graber et al. eds., 2018). 
26. See, e.g., Jordain Carney, Mueller Protection Bill Blocked in Senate for Third Time, HILL 
(Dec. 19, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/422171-mueller-protection-bill-
blocked-in-senate-for-third-time [https://perma.cc/ZRH8-QFZT] (noting a failed bill that would 
have codified Justice Department regulations requiring the action of a senior department official to 
fire Mueller).  
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electoral tribunal, and the main federal body charged with regulating elec-
tions, the Federal Elections Commission, has long been criticized as a rela-
tively weak and indecisive body.27 The FEC lost quorum in July, and was 
unable to act until December, when new commissioners were seated.28 Re-
gardless, there is little confidence in its ability to effectively enforce cam-
paign finance laws.29 Instead, elections in the United States are administered 
in a strikingly decentralized fashion, controlled by states and counties with a 
welter of different rules for voting and counting votes.30 In some cases, these 
local boards are not especially insulated from politics, since key officials 
themselves may be subject to election. Many observers, both inside and 
 
27. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1712 (1999) (noting the unlikelihood that the FEC would regulate 
in a manner that would meaningfully reform campaign finance through regulation and enforcement 
and citing to the weakness of the agency). 
28. Kate Ackley, FEC Set to Lose its Quorum Again, ROLL CALL (June 26, 2020, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/26/fec-set-to-lose-its-quorum-again/ [https://perma.cc/JGB7-
JSL2] (noting a brief period in which the FEC had enough members to hold an official meeting and 
another resignation that once again caused the Commission to lack a quorum); Brian Naylor, The 
Federal Election Commission Can Finally Meet Again. And It Has a Big Backlog, NPR (Dec. 24, 
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/24/949672803/the-federal-election-commission-
can-finally-meet-again-and-it-has-a-big-backlog [https://perma.cc/9F2V-CVSD].  
29. Naylor, supra note 28. 
30. To take two stark examples, California allows voter registration at the polling place on Elec-
tion Day and does not require most voters to show an ID when voting. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2170(c) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) (allowing conditional voter registration on Elec-
tion Day); What to Bring to Your Polling Place, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov
/elections/voting-resources/voting-california/what-bring [https://perma.cc/MG7J-E4YL] (“In most 
cases, a California voter is not required to show identification to a polling place worker before 
casting a ballot.”). Texas, by contrast, requires voter registration 30 days prior to Election Day and 
requires voters to provide a Texas driver’s license, election ID certificate, Texas personal ID card, 
Texas handgun license, U.S. citizenship certificate, U.S. military ID card, or U.S. passport. TEX. 
ELEC. CODE § 13.143(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (providing the voter registration 
deadline); Required Identification for Voting in Person, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://
www.votetexas.gov/register-to-vote/need-id.html [https://perma.cc/2S3E-CWSR]. Access to vot-
ing and vote-counting procedures were even more starkly divided during the pandemic. Some states 
automatically provided mail-in ballots to all voters and offered extensive drop boxes and return 
options, other states imposed strict procedural hurdles on mail-in ballot requests and ballot comple-
tions, and still others prohibited voters from requesting mail-in ballots on the basis of COVID-19 
concerns.  See, e.g., Elise Viebeck & Arelis R. Hernández, Coronavirus Cases Are Surging Again. 
These States Have Refused to Loosen Rules on Who Can Vote By Mail., WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020, 
5:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/vote-limits-coronavirus/2020/10/25
/523538c8-1223-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/3KQM-6ERD] (noting a 
refusal to loosen mail-in voting rules in Texas, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee); 
How to Vote in New Jersey, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, https://www.state.nj.us/state
/elections/vote-how-to.shtml [https://perma.cc/H7B4-4Y6T] (noting that “[a]ll active registered 
voters in New Jersey will automatically receive their ballots in the mail”); Witness Signature Re-
quired for Mail-in Ballots, S.C. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.scvotes.gov/witness-signature-
required-mail-ballots [https://perma.cc/3WSP-254X] (requiring voters to have a witness sign their 
mail-in ballot for ballots received after October 7).  
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outside the United States, looked on with concern after the 2020 election, 
struck by the haphazard nature of U.S. electoral administration.31   
But the U.S. approach to federalism in fact represents an alternative 
model of protecting democracy: dispersing control of core functions, includ-
ing the administration of elections, to the states. In Federalism for the Worst 
Case, we argued that U.S. federalism tends to significantly decentralize not 
only control of elections, but also other core functions such as judging, pros-
ecuting, and policing. Thousands of local and state officials hear the majority 
of court cases; police the streets; and, as highlighted here, administer all as-
pects of elections, including the election of federal officials.32 The result is a 
process that is often messy, is sometimes inefficient, and can even be unpro-
fessional.33 However, it also mitigates the major risk of the apex-level insti-
tution approach by making capture far less likely. Interestingly, then, the de-
centralized, messy nature of U.S. electoral administration may be a 
reasonably effective bulwark against efforts by an authoritarian president to 
make the overall electoral playing field unfair.  
Our argument is not that all forms of federalism provide this protection, 
but rather that the United States’ historically constructed variant of federal-
ism does a reasonable job of doing so, despite its costs. The U.S. approach of 
dispersing control over key functions is fairly distinctive in comparative 
terms. Many countries around the world have federal systems, but nonethe-
less have quite centralized electoral administrators, judges, police forces, and 
prosecutors.34 And in some countries, chief executives can rely on emergency 
powers to easily establish control over state personnel.35 
The U.S. version of federalism—with quite decentralized control over 
sensitive democratic functions—is a product of a broad mix of factors. In 
part, of course, it stems from the Constitution itself. The text, for example, 
 
31. See, e.g., COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY 
ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/search 
[https://perma.cc/2XEA-8R4V] (noting more than 500 cases challenging election procedures in 
forty-six states, plus D.C. and Puerto Rico); U.S. Election 2020: When Will We Know the Result?, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54096399 
[https://perma.cc/N4VU-4R8R] (citing  to the Stanford-MIT report and noting previous problems 
with state-administered elections, as in the 2000 election). 
32. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1213, 1218, 1220–22.  
33. Id. at 1192 n.19 (noting the inefficiencies of anticommandeering, in that it prevents state 
officials from enhancing certain powers by sharing enforcement responsibilities and other powers 
with the federal government). 
34. See id. at 1198–1201, 1211, 1216, 1218, 1220 (describing the centralized political apparat-
uses of other countries with federalist governments such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Russia). 
35. See, e.g., Bhagwan D. Dua, Presidential Rule in India: A Study in Crisis Politics, 19 ASIAN 
SURV. 611, 611–12 (1979) (describing Indira Gandhi’s use of emergency powers to dissolve state 
governments under opposition control).  
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gives state legislatures broad powers to determine the time, place, and man-
ner of even federal elections, although it also gives Congress the power to 
“make or alter” those regulations as it chooses.36 Commentators have noted 
that much of Congress’s residual authority in this area has gone unused.37 But 
some Supreme Court doctrines may bolster the independence of state author-
ities. For example, the anticommandeering doctrine generally prevents the 
federal government from forcing state or local officials to enforce federal 
law.38  
Although some U.S. decentralization is the product of the Constitution, 
much of it is a result of history and practice not directly compelled by either 
the Constitution or the Supreme Court. As already noted, Congress plausibly 
has much more authority under the Elections Clause than it has ever used.39 
Using the Commerce Clause, Congress could also vastly expand the reach of 
federal criminal law, even though the bulk of criminal jurisdiction has always 
resided with the states.40 Finally, nothing apparent in the Constitution would 
stop the federal government from massively expanding the number of federal 
law enforcement personnel, who are currently far outnumbered by their state 
and local counterparts.  
This type of sweeping expansion could lead to a significant erosion of 
the protective function we have identified. Consider the consternation caused 
this summer by the Trump administration’s movement of federal law en-
forcement personnel to cities such as Portland, Oregon, during protests linked 
to the Black Lives Matter movement.41 This concern would be substantially 
heightened if the federal government, rather than state and local authorities, 
were the dominant law enforcement presence in the country.  
The force that has prevented widespread federal takeover of these types 
of functions is probably not constitutional doctrine, but rather historical and 
practical factors. Citizens expect most law enforcement operations to be 
 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
37. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Commentary, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 112–13 (2013) (arguing that Congress could have stepped in to address a 
variety of recent U.S. voting issues); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. 
L. REV. 747, 775 (2016). 
38. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 188 (1992).  
39. See Issacharoff, supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
40. Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or 
“Crying Wolf?”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1326–29 (2000) (noting few checks on federal crim-
inal law jurisdiction).  
41. See, e.g., Giovanni Russonello, What Are Federal Agents Doing in Portland?, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/us/politics/portland-federal-agents-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/EWW4-VQK2] (noting opposition by protesters, the state of Oregon, 
and municipal leadership to “[m]ilitary-clad agents reporting to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity” policing protests in Portland).  
 
106 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 99:96 
 
local.42 And the amount of new taxation that would be necessary to build up 
a vast new federal law enforcement apparatus also makes such a step less 
likely.43 
In short, it may be something of a historical accident that U.S.-style fed-
eralism evolved such that states do not only possess formal (albeit somewhat 
limited) powers, but also a great deal of responsibility for carrying out the 
day-to-day functions of governance. The narrative is not wholly a happy one; 
the downsides of relying on states to administer central aspects of govern-
ance, such as election administration, are numerous. But the alternative of 
federal control does increase the worst-case threat of authoritarianism. 
II.  State Electoral Administration as a Bulwark Against Authoritarianism: 
The 2020 Election  
In the days following the 2020 election, then-President Trump de-
nounced the process of counting legitimate votes and called for it to immedi-
ately stop where he was winning and continue where he was losing.44 Pro-
testers took to the streets simply to argue for vote counting to proceed, while 
other armed protesters surrounded county voting headquarters in an attempt 
to impede the delivery of ballots and the associated vote tallying.45 Even after 
all major news networks had called the election and numerous international 
leaders had offered their congratulations, the President and the Republican 
Party (with a few exceptions) refused to concede or provide the resources 
traditionally available to the President-elect.46  
The effort continued throughout all phases of the process, up to the final 
stage on January 6, 2021, when Congress was due to carry through the for-
mality of counting and certifying received electoral votes.47 On that day, 
 
42. Cf. John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. 
L. REV. 673, 679 (1999) (“Traditionally, what is labeled ‘violent crime,’ ‘street crime,’ or ‘local 
crime’ has been the near exclusive responsibility of state and local government.”). 
43. Cf. Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1218–19 (noting that “the vast majority 
of law enforcement in the United States work at the state and local level,” as opposed to the federal 
level).  
44. See Shear et al., supra note 5 and accompanying text; Swan & Basu, supra note 2 and ac-
companying text.  
45. See, e.g., Maanvi Singh, ‘Count Every Vote’: Protestors Take to Streets Across US as Bal-
lots Are Tallied, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2020, 5:48 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/nov/04/protests-votes-ballot-counting-us-election [https://perma.cc/8KSS-XJEA] (not-
ing protests in cities around the United States).   
46. Nicholas Fandos & Emily Cochrane, Republicans Back Trump’s Refusal to Concede, De-
clining to Recognize Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us
/politics/republicans-trump-concede-2020-election.html [https://perma.cc/A4HE-ZBH8]. 
47. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES: AN OVERVIEW OF 
PROCEDURES AT THE JOINT SESSION, INCLUDING OBJECTIONS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 1 
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President Trump held a massive rally outside the White House, where he in-
cited a mob to march on the Capitol.48 The mob invaded the Capitol, erected 
a gallows outside it, and symbolically sought to hang leaders such as Vice 
President Mike Pence.49 Through these and other moves, the perpetrators car-
ried out violent actions that desecrated the seat of American government and 
led to at least five deaths, including a capitol police officer.50 Needless to say, 
these are hallmarks of a substantial erosion of democracy and the growth of 
authoritarianism.51 
During his four years in office, President Trump also made statements 
that alarmed scholars and commentators as paving the way for a potential 
move towards authoritarianism. He attempted to block efforts to investigate 
Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. election.52 He successfully shortened cen-
sus counting, thus affecting states’ representation in Congress;53 his Secretary 
of Commerce also unsuccessfully attempted to insert a citizenship question 
into the census—another factor that likely would have affected census re-
sponses and state representation.54 He attempted to limit the funding of the 
U.S. Postal Service during a period of expansive voting by mail, and he made 
 
(2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32717.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZN7-DNLT] (describing the 
electoral certification process and its 2021 date). 
48. Philip Rucker & Josh Dawsey, Trump Defiant and Unapologetic About His Role in Inciting 
Capitol Mob Attack, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 5:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol-
itics/trump-defiant-mob/2021/01/12/b93231bc-54f8-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DR99-ZTQP]. 
49. See Brandon T. Jett & Allison Robinson, The Chilling Similarities Between the Pro-Trump 
Mob and Lynchings a Century Ago, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/15/chilling-similarities-between-pro-trump-mob-lynchings-century-
ago/ [https://perma.cc/L7C5-L7MG] (describing and showing the gallows and noose outside of the 
capitol and chants of “Hang Mike Pence!”). 
50. Jack Healy, These Are the Five People Who Died in the Capitol Riot, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 11, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/who-died-in-capitol-building-attack.html 
[https://perma.cc/WTQ9-6RRD]. 
51. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
52. Quinta Jurecic, Obstruction of Justice in the Mueller Report: A Heat Map, LAWFARE (April 
21, 2019, 2:32 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-mueller-report-heat-map 
[https://perma.cc/VD5G-UGFX] (describing the Mueller Report’s assessment of whether President 
Trump obstructed justice in the investigation into Russia’s election interference),   
53. See Ross v. Nat’l Urban League, 141 S. Ct. 18, 18–19 (2020) (staying a preliminary injunc-
tion that would have required continued data collection due to “operational disruptions caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic”); Press Release, Steven Dillingham, Director, U.S. Census Bureau, State-
ment from U.S. Census Bureau Director Steven Dillingham: Delivering a Complete and Accurate 
2020 Census Count (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/deliv-
ering-complete-accurate-count.html [https://perma.cc/R6Z9-CG2P] (“We will end field data collec-
tion by September 30, 2020. Self-response options will also close on that date to permit the com-
mencement of data processing.”). 
54. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (invalidating the citizenship 
question insertion to the extent that the agency failed to provide adequate explanation for its action).  
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extensive comments denigrating voting by mail as allegedly beset by fraud.55 
Indeed, Trump knew that the mail-in vote would be dominated by Democrats 
in many key states, due in large part to his dismissive attitude towards the 
COVID-19 pandemic and his baseless attacks on the integrity of mail-in vot-
ing.56  
Despite these many efforts to curb the democratic voting process, voters 
were able to cast ballots in record numbers in the midst of the worst pandemic 
in recent history.57 Voter turnout as a percentage of the voter eligible popu-
lation was at its highest level since 1900.58 Many counties across the United 
States made herculean efforts to ensure that voters could vote and that their 
vote would count. They constructed and made available secure ballot drop 
boxes. In some cases they ensured—at the requirement of their states—that 
an official representative continuously monitored these drop boxes.59 They 
sent out and processed thousands of mail-in ballots, provided curbside and 
 
55. President Trump stated: 
Democrat officials never believed they could win this election honestly. I really believe 
that. That’s why they did the mail-in ballots, where there’s tremendous corruption and 
fraud going on. That’s why they mailed out tens of millions of unsolicited ballots with-
out any verification measures whatsoever. And I’ve told everybody that these things 
would happen, because I’ve seen it happen . . . . And I tell you, I would — I have been 
talking about this for many months with all of you. And I’ve said very strongly that 
mail-in ballots are going to end up being a disaster. Small elections were a disaster.  
Trump, supra note 1.  
56. Elizabeth Bauer, Separating Fact from Fiction on Trump and the Post Office – And Why It 
Matters, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2020/08/16/sep-
arating-fact-from-fiction-on-trump-and-the-post-officeand-why-it-matters/?sh=49a0b5323d74 
[https://perma.cc/2P6Y-M5V7] (quoting an interview with Fox Business in which President Trump 
stated: “[The Postal Service] want[s] $3.5 billion for something that will turn out to be fraudulent, 
that’s election money basically. They want $3.5 trillion—billion dollars for the mail-in votes, OK, 
universal mail-in ballots, $3.5 trillion”).  
57. Olivia B. Waxman, The 2020 Election Set a Record for Voter Turnout. But Why is it Normal 
for So Many Americans to Sit Out Elections?, TIME (Nov. 5, 2020, 9:24 AM), https://time.com
/5907062/record-turnout-history/ [https://perma.cc/9M29-FNJR] (“More Americans voted in 
2020—and voted by mail—than in any other election in U.S. history.”). 
58. Kevin Schaul, Kate Rabinowitz & Ted Mellnick, 2020 Turnout Is the Highest in Over a 
Century, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections
/voter-turnout/ [https://perma.cc/GP68-4KJ7]. 
59. See, e.g., Ian Lenahan, For the First Time, Absentee Drop Boxes Are in Play for New Hamp-
shire’s 2020 Elections, CONCORD MONITOR (Oct. 23, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.concordmoni-
tor.com/For-the-first-time-absentee-drop-boxes-are-in-play-for-New-Hampshire-s-2020-elections-
36941756 (noting New Hampshire’s first-time use of absentee ballot drop boxes, all of which were 
“staffed by a municipal employee”); VOPP: Table 9: Ballot Drop Box Definitions, Design Features, 
Location and Number, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 18, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-9-ballot-drop-box-definitions-design-
features-location-and-number.aspx [https://perma.cc/27EF-KHNQ] (describing states’ design re-
quirements for ballot boxes and requirements for county and other municipal officials).  
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drive-through voting opportunities, and, in many cases, encouraged residents 
to vote and provided detailed information on how to vote.60   
Other counties and states attempted to curtail votes or were incompetent 
in administering a complex voting process in the midst of the pandemic. 
Texas notoriously limited Harris County, which includes Houston, to one 
ballot drop box.61 Some counties in Ohio delegated absentee-ballot mailing 
to a private vendor, which happened to be owned by a supporter of President 
Trump, that delayed the mailing of “hundreds of thousands of absentee bal-
lots.”62 Ballot printing back-ups and mailing problems similarly delayed vot-
ing in other counties and states; this, compounded with U.S. Postal Service 
delays, caused many voters to miss the deadlines for returning their ballots.63 
In races with extremely thin margins, these types of procedures and mistakes 
could have tilted the election results toward Biden or Trump. 
But amidst the imperfections of the highly decentralized U.S. electoral 
process, one should also consider the ways in which the sometimes messy 
process of state- and county-run federal elections may have helped to prevent 
rapid moves towards authoritarianism. Despite President Trump’s bluster, he 
was unable to do much to influence either the design of electoral rules or the 
 
60. See, e.g., Trinady Joslin, For Nearly 3 Million Disabled Texans, Voting This Year is Even 
Harder, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/10/30/texas-vot-
ing-disability/ [https://perma.cc/F9GF-5A9Z] (noting that every county in Texas was required to 
offer curbside voting); Becca Savransky, ‘Astonishing’: Record Numbers of King County Voters 
Turning in Ballots Early, SEATTLE POST (Oct. 22, 2020, 7:47 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/se-
attlenews/article/Astonishing-Record-numbers-of-King-County-15667522.php 
[https://perma.cc/FA57-B9KH] (noting more than 195,000 ballots returned to county drop boxes 
and that “[e]lections officials are continuing to empty ballot boxes regularly, and are able to respond 
quickly to any reports of ballot boxes getting full.”); Curbside Voting, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://
www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/covid/curbside-voting-a-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TBB-
KD7A] (noting counties’ provision of curbside voting for individuals with COVID-19 signs or 
symptoms). 
61. Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, 610 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (af-
firming the validity of an order limiting ballot drop boxes to one per county).  
62. Doug Livingston, Absentee Ballot Mailings Delayed in Summit and Other Ohio Counties, 
AKRON BEACON J. (Oct. 8, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://www.beaconjour-
nal.com/story/news/2020/10/08/absentee-ballot-mailings-delayed-summit-cuyahoga-and-18-other-
counties/5925499002/ [https://perma.cc/ND4X-NQNM]; see also Reid J. Epstein, In Ohio, a Print-
ing Company Is Overwhelmed and Mail Ballots Are Delayed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/politics/ohio-mail-ballots-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2SZ-GR57]. 
63. See, e.g., Jacob Bogage & Christopher Ingraham, USPS Processed 150,000 Ballots After 
Election Day, Jeopardizing Thousands of Votes, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/05/usps-late-ballots-election/ 
[https://perma.cc/UCU4-97TE] (noting that “[m]ore than 150,000 ballots were caught in U.S. Postal 
Service processing facilities Wednesday and not delivered by Election Day”); Annie Grayer, Voters 




110 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 99:96 
 
counting of ballots—processes controlled by state and local officials over 
whom he had no direct authority. Imagine, instead, a hypothetical scenario in 
which a “Federal Electoral Commission” or “Tribunal” controlled voter reg-
istration, the process of voting, and the process of vote counting. If a presi-
dent were able to capture such an agency—and it is difficult to imagine that 
President Trump would not have at least attempted to do so—the risks of a 
rigged or tilted voting process would increase substantially.  
To be clear, we do not argue here that the protections provided by the 
U.S. system are foolproof. Indeed, the conduct of the election itself suggests 
ways in which a determined authoritarian might find choke points within 
state processes and federal workarounds to skirt state-based democratic pro-
tections. The 2020 election highlighted several of these dangers.  
One problem—as we have already noted—is that while the U.S. elec-
toral system is highly decentralized, it is often poorly insulated from partisan 
pressure.64 Indeed, many election officials are already highly partisan. This 
may lower the costs of capturing any particular election official. Compound-
ing this risk is the byzantine nature of U.S. election processes, which creates 
a number of different potential actors who can be captured to delay or alter 
results.65 Consider, for example, the way that President Trump’s allies 
 
64. See, e.g., David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf, Donald Moynihan, Carol L. Silva & Brady 
Baybeck, The Policy Views of Partisan Election Officials, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 551, 552, 552 n.6 
(2013) (arguing that decentralization does not insulate elections from partisan politics by state elec-
tion officials); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 141 (2009) (same).  
65. One way for a determined Executive to influence the vote would be to attempt to interfere 
in the actual voting and vote tallying process. There is no evidence of this having occurred in the 
2020 election, although there do appear to have been some party-based efforts that confused voters, 
such as Republican state and county entities installing unauthorized ballot boxes in California. See 
Letter from Alex Padilla, Cal. Sec’y of State, to Jessica Patterson, Chair, Cal. Republican Party; 
Fred Vanderhoof, Chairman, Fresno Cnty. Republican Party; Fred M. Whitaker, Chairman, Repub-
lican Party of Orange Cnty.; Dr. Richard Sherman, Chairman, L.A. Cnty. Republican Party (Oct. 
12, 2020), https://files.constantcontact.com/c1d64240601/cf61386b-2497-47a3-8556-
b5dba186f486.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH4R-GTTX] (describing complaints, “including photo-
graphs and reports of unauthorized drop boxes” in Fresno, Orange, and Los Angeles County, some 
of which were misleadingly labeled as “Secure Ballot Dropoff Location” and “approved and bought 
by the GOP,” and ordering the state GOP and county GOPs to “cease and desist the coordination, 
use an/or false or misleading promotion of unauthorized and non-official vote by mail drop boxes”). 
For literature on possible routes for the Executive’s party to potentially interfere with the voting and 
vote counting processes and mechanisms protecting against this, see, for example, Frank Emmert, 
Christopher Page & Antony Page, Trouble Counting Votes? Comparing Voting Mechanisms in the 
United States and Selected Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 18, 18, n.77 (2007) (noting 
“de facto delegation of vote counting to the private companies supplying the voting machines, such 
as Election Systems & Software (‘ES & S’), Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election 
Systems)” in the United States, and noting that these companies have links to specific political par-
ties); Rebecca Green, Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 810–11 
(2014) (noting increasingly public election records after Bush v. Gore, allowing, for example, the 
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attempted to leverage vote certification processes through which counties and 
states canvass votes—meaning provide unofficial election returns—and then 
formalize these returns by certifying them to the state.66  
This was most dramatic in Michigan, where both county and state can-
vassing boards are equally divided between Republican and Democratic par-
tisans.67 After the two Republicans on the Wayne County Board initially re-
fused to certify and then backtracked under intense pressure at a hearing, 
then-President Trump called one of them, and both Republicans then at-
tempted to recant their certification.68 Trump also attempted to pressure the 
state canvassing board, although it ultimately voted 3–0 (with one Republi-
can abstention) to certify.69 Michigan’s established law states that canvassing 
 
public posting of disputed ballots and public viewing of some vote recounts, but maintaining skep-
ticism about adequate transparency); Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between 
Secrecy and Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 58 (2010) (with mail-in ballots, 
noting the possibility that even for mail-in systems with strict affidavit provisions, a “willing notary” 
could allow fraud); Nathaniel Persily, “Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election 
Controversy: What the World Can Learn from Recent Election Dysfunction in the United States, 44 
IND. L. REV. 85, 107–08 (2010) (defining fraud and describing ways in which it can occur). 
66. The fifty states all have different requirements for this process. These varied statutes place 
deadlines by which counties must canvass votes—meaning provide unofficial election returns—and 
then formalize these returns by certifying them to the state. The state then canvasses and certifies 
the votes. After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/after-the-
voting-ends-the-steps-to-complete-an-election.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZSL6-H3FD]. 
67. MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ELECTIONS, MANUAL FOR BOARDS OF COUNTY 
CANVASSERS 1 (2020), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/BCC_Manual_464331_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6BE-NFL4]. 
68. For descriptions of the call, see, for example, David A. Fahrenthold, Beth Reinhard, Elise 
Viebeck & Emma Brown, Trump’s Escalating Attacks Put Pressure on Voter Certification Process, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2020, 7:14 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-escalat-
ing-attacks-put-pressure-on-vote-certification-process/2020/11/19/42f5fd76-2aa5-11eb-8fa2-
06e7cbb145c0_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6KL-CXKS]; Clara Hendrickson, Donald Trump 
Called Monica Palmer After Wayne County Board of Canvassers Meeting, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Nov. 19, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/19
/trump-monica-palmer-wayne-canvassers-certification-election/3776190001/ 
[https://perma.cc/28JP-NX34]. President Trump and other members of the Republican Party also 
used social media to attempt to influence county-level certification. After Republican members of 
the Wayne County Board of Canvassers initially refused to certify the election results for Biden, 
President Trump tweeted, “Wow! Michigan just refused to certify the election results! Having cour-
age is a beautiful thing.” The Michigan Republican Party Chairwoman stated, “I am proud that, due 
to the efforts of the Michigan Republican Party, the Republican National Committee and 
the Trump Campaign, enough evidence of irregularities and potential voter fraud was uncovered 
resulting in the Wayne County Board of Canvassers refusing to certify their election results.” Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 28, Mich. Welfare Rights Org. v. Donald J. Trump, 
No. 1:20-cv-03388 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 2020), 2020 WL 6826533.  
69. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 68, at ¶ 29; Craig Mauger & 
Melissa Nann Burke, Michigan Board Certifies Nov. 3 Election, Cementing Biden Victory, DETROIT 
NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/23
/michigan-election-state-canvassers-certification/6390475002/ [https://perma.cc/9ZCF-3B5U]. 
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boards have duties that are “purely ministerial and clerical,” and that they are 
bound by the returns and cannot investigate them to seek out fraud.70 While 
this jurisprudential principle may have reduced the likely impact of a dead-
locked vote, the design of the Michigan process and the political pressure 
brought to bear on it raised justifiable concerns.71  
In the future, there is clearly a risk that extreme partisan actors will work 
harder to capture state or local officials. This might be done through stacking 
canvassing boards or similarly obscure institutions such as those found in 
Michigan. Or, even more frighteningly, it might involve efforts to elect 
QAnon sympathizers or similar extremists to prominent election offices such 
as secretaries of state. The refusal of some key Republican actors—such as 
the Georgia Secretary of State—to alter or meddle with election results could 
easily be reversed should some of these offices fall into hyperpartisan 
hands.72 
Another kind of workaround is to find the centralized piece of an other-
wise decentralized process. President Trump may have pinpointed such an 
element in attempting to radically undermine the U.S. Postal Service during 
an election in which voting would occur heavily by mail, and in which—
because of his criticisms of mail-in ballots—it was virtually guaranteed that 
mail-in votes would tilt heavily against him.73 The moves by Postmaster Gen-
eral Louis DeJoy to, for example, dismantle a large number of mail sorting 
 
70. McQuade v. Furgason, 51 N.W. 1073, 1073 (Mich. 1892) (per curiam). Thus, even when 
county inspectors in Michigan alleged that a precinct had unlawfully allowed outsiders to go into 
booths with non-incapacitated voters—including an outsider who “fixed the ballots, and saw that 
they were cast as prepared by him,” because a County Board of Canvassers certified the results, the 
Board of State Canvassers had to accept them. Id. In Michigan, voters may address purported fraud 
through a quo warranto process after certification, rather than by blocking certification. Costantino 
v. City of Detroit, 950 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Mich. 2020) (Zahra, J., concurring) (citing MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 168.861 and cases addressing the quo warranto action).  
71. Shortly after meeting with President Trump at the White House, the Michigan Speaker of 
the House stated that a deadlock could lead to a “constitutional crisis” where it would be unclear 
who had authority to select electors. See Craig Mauger, Michigan Speaker Floats Possibility of 
‘Constitutional Crisis,’ DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 22, 2020, 11:17 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com
/story/news/politics/2020/11/22/michigan-house-speaker-floats-possibility-constitutional-crisis
/6381960002/ [https://perma.cc/UK2J-8UX9]. 
72. See 3rd Strike Against Voter Fraud Claims Means They’re Out After Signature Audit Finds 
No Fraud, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/3rd_strike_against_voter
_fraud_claims_means_theyre_out_after_signature_audit_finds_no_fraud [https://perma.cc/33L3-
44MP] (Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger after the Georgia recount stated: “The Sec-
retary of State’s office has always been focused on calling balls and strikes in elections, and, in this 
case, three strikes against the voter fraud claims and they’re out.”)  
73. Michael D. Shear, Trump Again Assails Mail-in Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/us/politics/trump-mail-in-voting.html [https://perma.cc/NA29-
ALQY] (noting numerous repeated statements by President Trump casting mail-in ballots as fraud-
ulent). 
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machines, did have a notable impact on mail delivery in the months surround-
ing the election.74 Indeed, more than 150,000 ballots were at risk of being 
thrown out by election officials due to mailing delays.75 But media and con-
gressional scrutiny seem to have prevented the problem from becoming 
worse, and many voters also seemed to adjust their behavior by sending bal-
lots in earlier or utilizing drop boxes.76 Of course, both the partisan tilt and 
sheer volume of mail ballots may reduce in future elections, which presuma-
bly will not be conducted in the thick of a pandemic.  
Another potential route around the decentralized elections system is re-
course to the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a means of 
undoing the election.77 The pandemic heightened this risk by forcing states 
to make changes to their voting rules. Given that many states did so through 
executive and judicial action, the risk again increased because of the reason-
ing employed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bush v. Gore:78 that the Election 
Clause gives power to the “state legislature,” not the state as such.79 This, in 
turn, gives potential warrant to the Supreme Court to forgo its usual deference 
in interpreting state law, and instead to police whether state executive or ju-
dicial determinations depart so radically from existing state election law that 
they are making, rather than interpreting, that law. Republicans opposing 
election results raised this argument in a number of cases surrounding the 
 
74. Andrew Solender, Reports of Dismantled USPS Sorting Machines Continue Despite DeJoy 
Announcing Halt, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2020, 2:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender
/2020/08/19/reports-of-dismantled-usps-sorting-machines-continue-despite-dejoy-announcing-halt
/?sh=323ab0a426b9 [https://perma.cc/L8A9-V8KF]. 
75. Bogage & Ingraham, supra note 63. 
76. See Pam Fessler, Ballot Drop Boxes Become Latest Front in Voting Legal Fights, NPR 
(Aug. 11, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/11/901066396/ballot-drop-boxes-be-
come-latest-front-in-voting-legal-fights [https://perma.cc/HVR9-R6RV] (describing drop boxes’ 
popularity); Solender, supra note 74 (noting that the Postmaster General halted the disassembly of 
machines, although in some cases too late). But see Bogage & Ingraham, supra note 63 (noting that 
the U.S. Postal Service delivered approximately 150,000 ballots the day after the election). 
77. Indeed, in 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that votes mailed before Election Day 
but received after Election Day could not be counted in Wisconsin, and it addressed numerous other 
challenges to state and county election procedures. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legisla-
ture, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.) The Court invalidated a U.S. district court-ordered “six-day ex-
tension of the receipt deadline for mail ballots postmarked by Election Day,” as summarized by the 
dissent, and describing other challenges also decided by the Court in 2020. Id. at 40 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting).). President Trump repeatedly asserted that he would go to the Supreme Court to vindi-
cate the election that he believed he had won. See, e.g., Morgan Chalfant & Brett Samuels, Trump 
Prematurely Declares Victory, Says He’ll Go to Supreme Court, HILL (Nov. 4, 2020, 2:57 AM) 
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/524404-trump-says-hell-go-to-supreme-court-to-stop-
votes-from-being-counted [https://perma.cc/MLF9-AR2D] (quoting President Trump as stating: 
“This is a major fraud on our nation. We want the law to be used in a proper manner. So we’ll be 
going to the U.S. Supreme Court. We want all voting to stop.”). 
78. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
79. Id. at 112–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).  
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2020 election, particularly those where state courts or executives extended 
deadlines for receipt of mail-in ballots. The Supreme Court has agreed with 
this argument in dicta in at least one case.80  
While the literature often conceptualizes courts, both in the United 
States and comparatively, as defenders of the democratic order, in fact they 
have frequently aided authoritarian actors in consolidating power across the 
world.81 But in the short run, problematic judicial interventions in U.S. elec-
tions seem far more plausible at the margins. The vote-by-mail deadline is-
sue, for example, would not have come close to swinging any decisive state. 
And it may be that the unique context of the 2020 election, during the most 
significant pandemic to occur in more than a century, heightened what would 
normally be a much lower risk of federal judicial intervention into state elec-
tion law, and one which fortunately did not materialize.  
Indeed, the Trump campaign’s legal challenges were overwhelmingly 
unsuccessful in both state and federal courts.82 The Trump campaign and its 
allies filed at least sixty-two lawsuits challenging election results in various 
states and won only one (insignificant) legal victory.83 Perhaps most dramat-
ically, the bizarre lawsuit filed by Texas and seventeen other states to chal-
lenge results in a handful of swing states was denied in a three-sentence order 
for lack of standing based on the failure to show a “a judicially cognizable 
interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections.”84  
A final “centralized” element in the decentralized U.S. elections process 
is the certification and counting of votes by the Congress itself, governed by 
the Twelfth Amendment and the “confusing” and “unwieldy” procedures of 
 
80. See Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020) (mem.) (“The provisions of 
the Federal Constitution conferring on state legislatures, not state courts, the authority to make rules 
governing federal elections would be meaningless if a state court could override the rules adopted 
by the legislature simply by claiming that a state constitutional provision gave the courts the author-
ity to make whatever rules it thought appropriate for the conduct of a fair election.”). For another 
case in which parties propounded this Bush v. Gore argument, see Emergency Application for a 
Stay Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Scarnati v. Pa. Dem-
ocratic Party, 141 S. Ct. 644 (2020) (mem.) (No. 20A53), 2020 WL 5898732.  
81. David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 53 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2020).  
82. See Alan Feuer & Zach Montague, Over 30 Trump Campaign Lawsuits Have Failed. Some 
Rulings are Scathing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/us/elec-
tions/trump-campaign-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/6FDL-MV8N]. 
83. See William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim Sergent, By The Numbers: President Donald 
Trump’s Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:01 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-
election-numbers/4130307001/ [https://perma.cc/6WG7-NL34]. 
84. See Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155, ORIG., 2020 WL 7296814, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2020) 
(mem.). 
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the Electoral Count Act.85 These were the events that precipitated the mob 
invasion on January 6, 2021. Here too, former President Trump attempted to 
apply pressure, both by working backroom channels and by whipping up and 
inciting the mob. Most ominously, he tried to pressure former Vice President 
Pence, in his role as presiding officer of the session, into unilaterally refusing 
to count electoral votes from a number of states that Trump baselessly con-
tested.86 It is dismaying that even after the violent mob descended on the cap-
itol, delaying the session for several hours, 139 Republican members of the 
House (and eight Republican Senators) joined unfounded objections to at 
least one state’s electoral results.87 But the relatively late date of the objec-
tion, after all election results had been certified and electoral votes cast, may 
have reduced the likelihood that the process could actually have been used to 
baselessly reverse the election. Further, we should reemphasize the limited 
nature of our argument: Our broad point is not that the particular characteris-
tics of U.S. federalism make authoritarian moves impossible, but simply 
slower and more difficult.  
III.  Costs of U.S. Federalism and the Second-Best Solution 
The literature critiquing U.S. federalism is legion.88 Here, we content 
ourselves with considering a few important problems that have been high-
lighted by the recent election: the risk of localized tyranny within subnational 
jurisdictions, the risk of inefficiency, and the threat that the central govern-
ments will use the existence of the states to shift blame. Each of these prob-
lems is well known; we do not deny their importance here, but do aim to 
show that they are consistent with U.S. federalism as a “second-best” solu-
tion. While extreme decentralization of functions tends to prevent best-case 
outcomes, it also acts as a kind of insurance mechanism that makes worst-
case outcomes less likely.  
 
85. See Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, Lost Opportunity: Learning the Wrong Lessons 
from the Hayes-Tilden Dispute, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2010) (arguing that the Electoral 
Count Act represented a lost opportunity that did not solve all the constitutional problems posed by 
the disputed 1876 Hayes-Tilden election and the Twelfth Amendment, and that Congress missed an 
opportunity to respond more effectively with an Electoral Commission or another more sweeping 
solution).   
86. See Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Says Pence Can Overturn His Loss in Congress. That’s Not 
How It Works., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-
trump-election.html [https://perma.cc/2BVK-TH7N]. 
87. Karen Yourish, Larry Buchanan & Denise Lu, The 147 Republicans Who Voted to Overturn 
Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/07/us
/elections/electoral-college-biden-objectors.html [https://perma.cc/ZR7J-TR6F]. 
88. See, e.g., MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20–29 (2008); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes 
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907–09 (1994) (arguing that decentralization can 
achieve many of the values purportedly unique to federalism). 
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A. Localized Tyranny and Oppression 
One of the most durable critiques of federalism notes that it provides 
states space to repress minority groups within their jurisdiction.89 U.S. his-
tory, of course, offers many examples of that phenomenon; witness the his-
toric discrimination, and then resistance to civil rights such as desegregation, 
practiced in the southern United States for a long period of time.90 Indeed, 
southern states were particularly repressive in the election context during the 
Jim Crow Era, using “poll taxes, literacy tests, registration barriers, intimida-
tion at the polls, or bald violence” to block minority votes.91 This kind of 
tyranny might be more likely at the state rather than federal level for the rea-
sons classically noted by Madison in The Federalist: factions may find it eas-
ier to grab unfettered control of the machinery of government on a smaller 
scale.92 State-level rules and constitutions are also often easier to change or 
manipulate.  
Restrictions on voting are one important way in which incumbents in 
states have tilted the electoral playing field in their favor. Particularly after 
the Supreme Court’s Shelby County v. Holder93 decision weakened the Vot-
ing Rights Act,94 Republican-controlled states passed a raft of stringent voter- 
ID laws and other measures that made it more difficult to vote.95 The pan-
demic, of course, pushed this issue to a new level of urgency during the 2020 
election. Some states went to great lengths to accommodate voter concerns, 
for example by expanding early and mail-in voting and easing rules or re-
strictions on these paths.96 Other states were far less accommodating, as 
 
89. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51, supra note 16 (expressing concerns about how 
minority interests would fare at the state level); Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403, 1404 (1982) (noting states’ failures to protect minority 
rights).  
90. See Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 1192, 1192 n.18 (summarizing the 
problem and providing citations); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case 
for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 473 (2002) 
(noting southern states’ obstinance in the face of federal directives to enforce civil rights). 
91. Green, supra note 65, at 791 n.58.  
92. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 16.  
93. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  
94. Id. at 557.  
95. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2145–46 (2015).  
96. See, e.g., Vote by Mail, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-reg-
istration/vote-mail [https://perma.cc/55FK-GC3M] describing mail-in ballots provided to all vot-
ers); N.J. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 30 (same). 
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evidenced by Texas’s notorious limitation on ballot drop boxes to one per 
county despite substantial U.S. Postal Service delays.97  
More broadly, recent experience has shown a significant risk that parties 
gaining full control over state-level government, especially in “swing” states, 
may use that control to further entrench power. The classic way of doing so 
is gerrymandering districts to provide the incumbent party with future ad-
vantages, but this is only one of several common tools. Consider North Car-
olina and Wisconsin. In both cases, Republicans won control of state legisla-
tures in 2010 and imposed extreme gerrymanders on both state and federal 
districts. In 2018, for instance, Republicans won a minority of the vote for 
the lower house of the Wisconsin state legislature with only 48% of the vote, 
but nonetheless took fifty-six of sixty-three seats.98 The Wisconsin state leg-
islature also passed important laws greatly weakening public and private-sec-
tor unions, which in turn aided the party’s efforts to stay in power by under-
mining a powerful electoral opponent.99 Finally, when Democrats won the 
governorship of both states (in 2016 and 2018, respectively), both legislatures 
passed a set of laws that changed the balance of the separation of powers, 
stripping appointment and other powers from the executive branch and in-
stead lodging these authorities with the legislature.100 
The risk of localized oppression is clearly a significant one. Moreover, 
especially in an era of very nationalized parties, there is a risk that parties 
will use their grip on state governments not just to entrench local power, but 
also to tilt the federal electoral playing field in their favor. If one party were 
to win the bulk of “swing” states such as North Carolina and Wisconsin, it 
could use that power to effectively make it more difficult for the other party 
to win national elections. For this reason, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq 
 
97. See Abbott v. The Anti-Defamation League Austin, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2020) (per 
curiam) (describing and affirming the validity of the governor’s order on ballot drop box limits). 
98. See Philip Bump, The Several Layers of Republican Power-Grabbing in Wisconsin, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 4, 2018 11:44 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/04/several-lay-
ers-republican-power-grabbing-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/M22W-MGB4]. 
99. See Frank Manzo IV, Wisconsin Unions Depleted Under Governor Walker, MIDWEST 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://midwestepi.org/2018/09/24/wisconsin-unions-de-
pleted-under-governor-walker/ [https://perma.cc/E4DE-G9LN] (describing how Wisconsin Act 10 
and “right-to-work” laws have depleted both public and private union membership in the state); 
Mark Pitsch, Balance of Power: Walker’s union proposal could be major setback for state’s Dem-
ocratic Party, WIS. STATE J. (Mar. 7, 2011), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-poli-
tics/balance-of-power-walkers-union-proposal-could-be-major-setback-for-states-democratic-
party/article_87f6ba78-46c6-11e0-a5fc-001cc4c002e0.html [https://perma.cc/V5XA-YQR8] (“‘I 
consider organized labor to be the backbone of the Democratic Party,’ said Mike Tate, state party 
chairman. ‘Part of Scott Walker's strategy is to weaken the infrastructure of the Democratic 
Party.’”). 
100. Maggie Astor, Wisconsin, Limiting Governor, Borrows a Page from North Carolina’s 
Book, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/us/politics/wisconsin-gov-
ernor-legal-challenge.html [https://perma.cc/26JF-NXXA]. 
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suggest that the impact of federalism on authoritarianism is indeterminate.101 
Indeed, some have voiced concerns that in the wake of President Trump re-
fusing to concede, Republican states could “appoint electors who ignore the 
election results and vote for Trump in states he lost.”102 Alternatively, a state 
such as Florida could allow former President Trump to operate a “shadow 
government” through media and other actions over the next four years—a 
move that would substantially undermine U.S. democracy by causing mil-
lions in Trump’s loyal following to refute the legitimacy of the duly elected 
president.103 Federalism may slow authoritarian movements by requiring 
them to capture more entities in order to consolidate power, but the costs of 
capture may also be lower at the state level. 
Our answer to this point is more empirical than theoretical: if one looks 
around the world, there appear to be a number of cases where seemingly well-
designed apex institutions have been captured, often quite quickly. And the 
impact of this capture is frequently overwhelming: elections are radically 
tilted in favor of incumbents, independent media outlets and opposition par-
ties are systematically harassed, and so on.104  We do not deny that the impact 
of one-party capture of state government for antidemocratic ends can be sig-
nificant. But at the very least, given the rhythm of U.S. elections, that capture 
will be a slow and gradual process, subject to repudiation by voters along the 
way. Capture of key individual states can tilt the playing field, but not as 
dramatically as would be the case if U.S. elections depended only on a single 
entity, such as a federal electoral tribunal. 
B. Inefficiency and Blame Shifting 
Beyond threatening local tyranny, the United States’ extremely decen-
tralized variant of federalism often appears to produce inefficient or even ar-
bitrary policy outcomes. The 2020 election arguably provided an example in 
a context where the fundamental right to vote was in play. The ease with 
which citizens could vote in the election depended significantly on their state, 
with little federal guidance or legislation. 
 
101. See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 78, 160–62 (2018).  
102. Leonhardt, supra note 13. 
103. See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, What is Trump Playing At?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/opinion/trump-concession-transition.html?auth=login-
email&login=email [https://perma.cc/YZ2F-L2YA] (quoting Princeton history professor Sean 
Wilentz’s concerns about “a kind of Trumpian government in exile, run from Mar a Lago or maybe 
from wherever else Trump selects to reside in, in order to avoid prosecution by the State of New 
York”).  
104. See generally Landau, Wiseman & Wiseman, supra note 8 (documenting the recent ero-
sion of democracy in a number of countries, such as in Poland, Russia, Hungary, and Venezuela).  
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Despite these flaws, in many cases the inefficiency of U.S. federalism 
serves as a second-best—and a very important second-best, at that: It is 
clearly suboptimal when compared to of the potential for coordinated and 
effective federal action, but it also provides a kind of insurance mechanism 
against very bad policy outcomes. An effective or coordinated federal elec-
tion law covering these issues may have been quite helpful, for example, in 
mandating or providing funding for greatly expanding mail-in voting or in 
standardizing rules about issues such as ballot receipt dates and counting. But 
federal law could also have played a counterproductive role; for example, 
federal officials could have restricted early or mail-in voting and counting 
despite the pandemic, as some Republican proposals sought to do.105 And in 
the absence of a coordinated federal response, state and local governments 
provided a second-best solution by providing important accommodations in 
many cases. While “blue” states tended to provide the most sweeping 
changes to accommodate the right to vote,106 key changes were also made in 
some “red” states.107 
A related danger of relying on states to carry out key governance func-
tions such as election administration is that it facilitates blame-shifting by 
federal officials towards the states. The aftermath of the 2020 election has 
provided a dramatic example. Former President Trump has repeatedly and 
falsely insisted that there is rampant voter fraud in some states and localities, 
despite a complete absence of empirical evidence. In the wake of the election, 
he accused states of taking illegal “ballot dumps” and purposefully double-
counting Democratic ballots.108 This castigation of a system beyond the 
 
105. See Jeremy Stahl, Republican Senator Proposes Bill That Would Make It Illegal to Count 
Votes, SLATE (Sept. 24, 2020, 6:05 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/09/republican-
senator-bill-illegal-mail-vote-count-deadline.html [https://perma.cc/6ZCW-SJL9] (describing the 
V.O.T.E.R. Act sponsored by Senator Rick Scott, which would have disqualified mail-in ballots 
arriving after Election Day, prevented mail-in ballots received prior to Election Day from being 
counted until the morning of Election Day, and required all votes to be counted within twenty-four 
hours of poll closing).  
106. See Voting Laws Roundup 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Dec. 8, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-2020-0 
[https://perma.cc/M53M-4KQR] (listing seven states that enacted expansive voting laws protecting 
the right to vote, of which six were Democrat-controlled states). 
107. See Paul Flahive, ‘It’s Ridiculous’: States Struggle To Accommodate COVID-19 Positive 
Voters, NPR (Aug. 9, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/09/900317332/it-s-ridiculous-
states-struggle-to-accommodate-covid-positive-voters [https://perma.cc/K2R2-P2RY] (noting that 
all states have made some accommodations, although they varied sharply); Patrick Svitek, Gov. 
Greg Abbott Extends Early Voting for November Election by Six Days, Starting Oct. 13, TEX. TRIB. 
(July 27, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/27/texas-greg-abbott-early-vot-
ing-november/ [https://perma.cc/4GXY-XWP6]. 
108. Jack Brewster, Trump Renews Ballot ‘Dump’ Conspiracy Theory Claim—Here’s Why It’s 
Bogus, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster
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control of the Executive is particularly problematic in the context of voting. 
The ability of the president to shake voters’ confidence in the accuracy of 
electoral results could pave the way for an illegitimate power grab. It is worth 
noting, however, that a plausible outcome of a more centralized system 
would have been an illegitimate power grab through direct interference with 
the voting and vote-counting processes. 
While the blame shifting problem is a real one, we again think it needs 
to be put in context as a “second best.” With respect to the pandemic re-
sponse, the existence of the states may have decreased federal will to take 
action, but even absent the states there is no guarantee that the Trump admin-
istration would have acted vigorously or competently. With respect to voting, 
it is clearly dangerous for an executive to persuade a large segment of the 
population that the entire voting system is illegitimate. But it would be much 
worse for the Executive to administer a centralized election system. Because 
the Executive can only cast blame on—not directly control—the state elec-
tion system, his powers to upend the system are somewhat limited. The 2020 
election has been a test of the extent and magnitude of those powers.  
IV.  Conclusion  
U.S. federalism without question imposes costs. But we think it also 
provides a unique benefit that has been on display in the aftermath of the 
2020 election: protection against the kinds of moves towards authoritarian-
ism that have recently occurred in many countries around the world. The dis-
persal of core functions, including judging, law enforcement, and (as this es-
say has emphasized) electoral administration, likely acts as a bulwark that 
slows moves towards authoritarianism.  
Our argument is not that the U.S. system is ideal, and indeed one of the 
goals of our analysis is to highlight avenues for reform. In Part I, we outlined 
two different ways to protect core functions like electoral administration—
insulating them in centralized institutions (as many other countries do) and 
decentralizing them (as in the United States). The two logics could be com-
bined by creating institutions that are both quite decentralized and independ-
ent, unlike the highly partisan, localized electoral administration found across 
much of the United States, such as in the Michigan canvassing boards or par-
tisan secretaries of state. Creating more independent local electoral institu-
tions would lessen the risk posed by some of the chokepoints highlighted in 
the former President’s struggle to overturn the 2020 election. Reducing the 
leverage of “centralized” aspects of the U.S.’s decentralized system, for 
 
/2020/11/30/trump-renews-ballot-dump-conspiracy-theory-claim-heres-why-its-bogus/?sh=
6c2892bf1dca [https://perma.cc/9CM3-XSDA]; Trump, supra note 1. 
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example by clarifying Congress’s role under the Electoral Count Act, may 
also be useful.  
Still, the images of county officials painstakingly tallying each individ-
ual ballot, with monitors from both parties peering over their shoulders, pro-
vide a stark contrast to gun-toting protesters demanding a stop to the count, 
or storming the U.S. Capitol in a violent rage. They suggest a continuation of 
American democracy, despite an unprecedented effort to undermine it.  
 
 
